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Model Specication and CDO (Mis)Pricing
ABSTRACT
Complex structured products, especially collateralized debt obligations (CDOs),
were at the center of the 2008 credit crisis. This paper explores the impact of modeling
diculties on CDO mispricing. Comparing pricing outputs among models with dier-
ent specications, we show that the use of a model with advanced default correlation
assumptions could have reduced the amount of model-implied AAA-rated CDO securi-
ties. This pricing dierence also has predictive power for the subsequent downgrading
of AAA-rated CDO tranches. However, the model specication is only qualitatively
important for CDO mispricing, as it has a modest quantitative eect in explaining the
overall pricing errors.
JEL Classication: G12; G13; E43; E44
Keywords: CDO; Model Specication; Default Correlation; Frailty
I. Introduction
The 2007-2009 credit crisis has had unprecedented impact on the nancial industry.1 At the
center of this crisis is the previously little known nancial innovation called collateralized debt
obligations (CDOs). CDOs are debt claims with various seniorities against collateral asset
pools. Senior claimholders will not suer a loss until the subordinated tranches are exhausted.
Because of this prioritized structure and other credit enhancements, such as insurance, CDO
senior tranches had AAA credit ratings prior to the crisis. CDO issuance started in 1987
but remained dormant until 1997, with an annual issuance of $17 billion, since then the
market has grown rapidly to reach an annual issuance of $520.6 billion in 2006, according
to Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA). CDO issuance peaked in
2007Q2 (quarterly issuance of $178.6 billion) and afterward declined exponentially (2009Q1
issuance $0.8 billion). However, the strikingly strong recovery of the CDO market, especially
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs), in recent years has prompted signicant concerns over
the market and its valuation.2 Given the dramatic write-downs associated with CDOs during
the credit crisis3 and the resurgence of the CDO market in recent years, it is important to
develop a good understanding of CDO valuation. We present a comprehensive study of CDO
pricing with a focus on the impact of model specication. Our study elucidates potential
structural causes of CDO mispricing.
The innovative nature of CDOs makes it dicult to identify the exact reasons for this val-
uation failure before the credit crisis. On the one hand, given the short history of the product
and modeling diculties, Due (2007) doubts that anyone has capability to evaluate CDOs
1Among the top-ve precrisis Wall Street investment banks, Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy on
September 15, 2008, Bear Stearns was acquired by J. P. Morgan on March 16, 2008, Merrill Lynch was
acquired by Bank of America on September 14, 2008, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley converted into
bank holding companies on September 21, 2008.
2see, e.g., \CLO surge prompts regulatory concerns", Financial Times, September 8, 2014. CLO per-
formance will remain solid in 2016 according to Moody's (2015). We are also seeing a turnaround for the
European CLO market. \Time looks ripe for European collateralised loan obligations", Financial Times,
January 21, 2016.
3For instance, on July 28, 2008, Merrill Lynch sold $30.6 billion in notional value U.S. super senior ABS
CDOs to an aliate of Dallas, Texas-based private equity rm Lone Star Funds for $6.7 billion, or 22 cents
on a dollar. (Merrill Lynch also nanced 75% of the sale through a loan with recourse only on those CDOs.)
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with comfortable accuracy. Accepting the complexities and modeling diculties, some jour-
nalists blame the quants and their models for \killing the Wall Street"4. On the other hand,
regulators and media have rushed to blame CDO underwriters and credit rating agencies, who
brought CDOs to the marketplace, owing to their potential conicting incentives. While some
market participants likely deserve more blame than others, \careful research is needed to dis-
tinguish the relative importance of the bad incentives view and the mispricing view", as these
two views have distinctly dierent implications for future regulation and risk management
(Allen (2008)).
Given the limitations in modeling techniques and historical data, large losses do not au-
tomatically imply risk management failures (Stulz (2008)). This argument is particularly
relevant for the current setting of CDOs, which are collateralized on a pool of default-risky
assets. Accurate valuation of CDOs requires the joint distribution of those assets, especially
the default correlation, to be modeled. Defaults are rare events. Hence, the default correla-
tion is dicult to measure. Furthermore, even single-obligor credit risk analysis is dicult.
There is also little consensus on the best practices for portfolio credit risk modeling. In this
paper, we examine the impact of model specication on portfolio credit risk evaluation and
CDO mispricing.5
Traditional portfolio credit risk models, such as that of Vasicek (1987), assume that the
default correlation is driven only by observable common factors. However, recent studies
show that such an approach signicantly underestimates the actual default correlation (Das,
Due, Kapadia, and Saita (2007)). Based on this observation, Due, Eckner, Horel and
Saita (DEHS, 2009) propose a frailty correlated default model, in which the latent \frailty"
factor is unobservable and time varying. Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009) show that
their model performs well in matching historical default patterns, and Collin-Dufresne (2009)
also discusses the properties for good correlation models. Azizpour, Giesecke, and Schwenkler
(2017) nd important roles of both frailty and contagion for default clustering.
4see, e.g., \Recipe for disaster: The formula that killed Wall Street", Wired, February 23, 2009. Triana
(2009) expressed similar views.
5The issues on conicts of interest and CDO security design are discussed by Grin and Tang (2012),
Nicolo and Pelizzon (2008).
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Our simulation results on model specication substantiate the importance of the frailty
factor to portfolio credit risk valuation and CDO pricing. We focus on the tail risk that
is most relevant to CDO senior tranches that are often rated AAA. At the AAA level, the
expected portfolio default loss rate is 5.4% higher when frailty is considered than when it is
not. Hence, ignoring the frailty factor would result in a 5.4% greater AAA tranche size. We
further consider the impact of correlation between macroeconomic factors on CDO pricing in
the presence of frailty factor. In reality, there might be correlation between macroeconomic
factors. For example, when the market undergoes a crisis, the central bank will step in and
cut interest rates to inject liquidity into the market, which essentially creates a correlation
between the short-term interest rate and stock market performance. However, our simulation
results show that such consideration of correlation between macroeconomic factors has little
eect on portfolio credit risk valuation and CDO pricing when the frailty factor is present.
Having examined the potential impacts of model specication on CDO valuation, we
apply the DEHS frailty model to historical CDO data. Our sample contains 237 CDOs issued
between May 1998 and December 2004, including 46 collateralized bond obligations (CBOs),
82 CLOs, 99 CDOs collateralized with asset-backed securities (ABS CDOs), which includes
most mortgage-back securities, and 10 CDOs collateralized with other CDO tranche securities
(CDO2s). When the credit rating or pricing for CDOs is obtained, the collateral pool is
typically incomplete. Rating agencies will thus conduct an analysis and assign a rating based
on the projected collateral pool characteristics. To price CDOs, we rst generate factor time
series based on the CDO's collateral pool characteristics. Then, we insert these factor time
series into the no-frailty model (bad model) and the dynamic-frailty model (good model) and
generate the collateral pool loss distribution. With the collateral pool loss distribution, we
can determine the AAA tranche size by referring to the historical AAA default probability.6
We then compare the resulting AAA tranche size from the dierent model specications
(no-frailty vs. frailty model).
Our empirical ndings are consistent with the simulation results. Specically, the no-
frailty model generates lower portfolio default rates and hence higher AAA tranche sizes than
6Section II discusses the tranche determination approach in details.
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the results from a credit rating agency. The no-frailty model underestimates default rates by
6% on average; however, the frailty factor increases the portfolio default rate at AAA level by
19%. Therefore, accounting for the frailty factor could shrink AAA-rated CDO tranches by
13%. If the frailty model is indeed useful, we would observe subsequent downgrades of CDO
AAA tranches when the frailty model indicates higher risk than the rating agency model. Up
to December 2008, most changes in CDO ratings at the AAA level occurred with ABS CDOs,
and in October 2009, we witness more AAA downgrading in the other CDO categories. We
nd that the frailty model exhibits substantial power in separating out the safest and riskiest
CDOs, although the relationship is not strict monotone. According to the frailty model, about
92% of AAA-rated tranches with high risk are subsequently downgraded, whereas 29% are
downgraded for the low-risk group. The frailty model signicantly predicts the future AAA
tranche downgrading.
We make three contributions to the literature. First, we elucidate the potential structural
causes of CDO mispricing. Grin and Tang (2012) document the importance of out-of-model
adjustments for CDO mispricing and nd that smaller model-implied AAA sizes receive larger
adjustments. We further show that model specication can aect the model-implied CDO
AAA tranches, which partially contribute to the CDO mispricing. However, considering the
out-of-model adjustment, we expect that even if we have the best model, CDOs were still
mispriced. Model constraints played some role in CDO mispricing. Second, although model
uncertainty is well studied in equity markets and portfolio allocation (e.g., Garlappi, Uppal,
and Wang (2007)), we apply it to the credit derivatives market and show its strong impact
in this market. Third, our study provides a good framework for the analysis of nancial
innovations, which will likely continue, and the same model issues would appear repeatedly.
Therefore, our research provides a preliminary direction for future risk management practice.
Our study builds on Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009), and we add to existing studies
in the following ways. While Longsta and Rajan (2008) argue that historical CDO prices are
well explained, Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009a) show that substantial mispricing can arise
in the CDO structuring process. Our nding of systematic mispricing due to model misspec-
ication provides a justication for these seemingly conicting ndings. Fender, Tarashev,
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and Zhu (2008) also show that CDOs can be overvalued in comparison with equivalent corpo-
rate bonds. Feldhutter and Nielsen (2012) and Heiteld (2009) use MCMC for CDO pricing.
Choi, Doshi, Jacobs, and Turnbull (2016) introduce a top-down no-arbitrage model for pric-
ing structured products with economic variables. Longsta and Myers (2014) focus on the
valuation of the equity tranche of the CDO. Our study diers from these studies in terms of
the economic motivation and the focus on model risk for CDO mispricing. Finally, our paper
corroborates the suggestion by Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009b) and Rajan, Seru, and Vig
(2015) that model performance may depend on the user's incentives.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the setting of our study and
relevant literature. Our simulation results on the eects of model specication are discussed
in Section III. An empirical analysis using historical CDO data and the implications for CDO
mispricing are presented in Section IV. Section V concludes the paper.
II. CDO Primer and Relevant Literature
The prototype of a CDO originated in 1987 at the junk bond powerhouse Drexel Burnham
Lambert (bankrupt in February 1990). The resurgence in the current format is mostly at-
tributed to Credit Suisse First Boston in 1997 (notably Christopher Ricciardi).7 CDOs are
investment conduits that hold credit securities as collateral assets and issue secured notes as
liabilities with a prioritized payment structure. They belong to the category of pay-through
asset-backed securities (ABS).8 Major collateral asset types include corporate loans and bonds,
but other types include ABS and credit derivative contracts. Based on the collateral asset
types, CDOs can be classied into CLOs, CBOs, ABS CDOs, CDO2, and so forth. Most
CDOs have multiple tranches with various debt claim seniorities, where parts of the tranches
are sold to dierent investors. However, single-tranche CDOs (\bespoke" CDOs) are often
7The development of the credit derivatives market in general is largely attributed to J. P. Morgan (notably
Blythe Masters), which invented the credit default swaps (CDS) that fueled the synthetic CDO market.
8CDOs are distinguishable from traditional ABS in two aspects. First, CDOs structure and collateral assets
are much more diverse than those of traditional ABS. Second, CDOs liability structure is more complex with
trigger events to retire the senior tranches and other credit enhancements.
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structured specically for a particular investors needs. CDO underwriters structure the deal
and arrange the CDO notes placements. Except static deals, CDO assets are administered
by collateral managers, and CDO operations are overseen by trustees.
The CDO market has been a rated market from the beginning, and in practice, many
investors rely on the ratings for CDO pricing. Before the CDO issuance, it is almost always
critical for CDO issuers to secure target ratings. Typically, the CDO underwriter submits
the CDO term sheet to one or more credit rating agencies, who will conduct CDO valuation
based on the projected collateral characteristics. The underwriter and the credit rating agency
need to agree the credit rating. Otherwise, the underwriter may use ratings from another
credit rating agency. All three major rating agencies (S&P, Moody's, and Fitch) employ
simulation methods when rating CDOs. Since CDOs are debt claims constructed from the
underlying collateral portfolio, the valuation of CDOs starts with and depends heavily on
an accurate assessment of the credit risk of the collateral portfolio. Specically, credit rating
agencies rst simulate portfolio loss rates based on the CDO collateral asset information. The
portfolio loss distribution can be obtained by using various approaches and default correlation
assumptions. The default correlation assumption aects the thickness of the right tail of the
portfolio loss distribution (i.e. the probability of big losses), which is particularly important
for the CDO senior tranche. Because of the prioritized structure of CDOs, senior tranche
holders will not suer a loss unless the loss is suciently large and the subordinated tranches
are exhausted. When default correlation is high, we will have more clustered defaults and
limited diversication benets. Senior tranches and junior tranches will have similar cash ow
streams.
Two dierent approaches are often used to derive the loss distribution for the collateral
portfolio. The structural approach assumes that asset value processes are correlated, and
a rm defaults when its asset value falls below some default threshold. The asset value is
simulated with imposed correlations, and the credit portfolio value is determined after all
assets are simulated. Repeating the simulation multiple times results in a distribution of
the portfolio value. The reduced-form approach assumes that default occurs suddenly and
unpredictably. A correlation structure is directly imposed on the default probability. The
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default intensity can be linked to rm-specic and market-wide variables, and the number of
defaults in the collateral portfolio follows a given distribution. The portfolio loss rate is then
drawn repeatedly from this default distribution.9
After obtaining the distribution of the portfolio loss rate, the tranche size is determined by
referencing the scenario default rate (SDR) of the desired rating. Specically, the simulated
distribution of the portfolio loss rate is used to map the idealized default rate for a scenario
into a SDR. The idealized default rate for a scenario (D) is the maturity-specic \default
criteria" that gives the probability of the occurrence of the scenario according to the historical
corporate bond default rate with the same rating. Then SDR is the portfolio default rate (with
some adjustment based on default experience) for which the default probability exceeding this
portfolio default rate is no greater than D, i.e. Pr(default rate  SDR) = D.10 The tranche
must withstand the SDR of the desired rating. For example, for a CDO senior tranche with
a AAA credit rating, i.e. AAA scenario, the probability that the portfolio loss rate is greater
than the SDR should be lower than the historical AAA corporate bond default rate. Then, the
AAA tranche size is determined as one minus the SDR (1-SDR). Grin and Tang (2012) and
Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) provide detailed discussions about the S&P's SDR approach
for the tranche determination. SDRs are key to obtaining desired ratings for CDO tranches.11
Although agency conicts may arise during the security design (Mehran and Stulz (2007)),
structured nance instruments, particularly CDOs, can be useful investment tools as long as
the default correlation is low, as shown by DeMarzo (2005) and Leland (2007). However, the
default correlation is dicult to measure, which contributes to the failure of CDO valuation
(Brunnermeier (2009)). For such low occurrence events, the Bayesian approach is particularly
appealing (Glasserman and Li (2005)). Therefore, to assess the credit risk of structured nance
instruments such as CDOs, it is necessary to consider both the rm-specic default predictors
9See Internet Appendix in Grin and Tang (2012) for a detailed discussion of the CDO valuation models.
10We follow S&P's terminology and refer it as SDR. It is default scenario collateral loss rate by Moody's.
The descriptions are based on the published documents such as Moody's (1998), S&P (2002), and Fitch
(2006).
11The purchase price for CDO notes are mostly at par. The coupon rate on each tranche is the most
visible pricing indicator. However, the coupon rate, rating and tranche size are jointly determined. The credit
spread of a given rating is easily agreeable. Hence, the most critical pricing component is the tranche size
(equivalently the risk level of the tranche, i.e., the SDR). We focus on the tranche size and SDR throughout
this paper and use rating, pricing, and valuation interchangeably.
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and, more challengingly, the default correlation.
One rms default status may also aect another rm's default probability. For instance,
Acharya, Schaefer, and Zhang (2015) document the impact of the downgrades of GM and Ford
on all the constituents in the market, even though some of them are completely unrelated
to GM and Ford. Jorion and Zhang (2007) conduct a larger scale analysis of bankruptcies
and nd similar results. Reasons why these seemingly unrelated rms share a default factor
may be learning, as argued by Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2015) and
Giesecke (2004), or market structure, as argued by Allen and Carletti (2006). A conventional
portfolio loss risk model assumes that the default correlation is attributable only to observable
factors. Even with the benets of various rm-specic and macroeconomic covariates, how-
ever, Das, Due, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) nd empirical evidence that defaults are more
clustered than conventional models suggest based merely on observable factors. DEHS (2009)
provides a new model for corporate default intensity with a time-varying common latent fac-
tor, as well as in the presence of a rm-specic unobservable covariate. They nd that the
prediction power of a general credit model will increase dramatically if a common unobserv-
able covariate is incorporated into the model. Compared with traditional models, this model
is especially eective for default clustering estimation. However, this rened pricing model
still suers from parameter uncertainty. In addition to the frailty factor, recent literature
documents the important role of contagion in explaining the default clustering. Helwege and
Zhang (2016) investigate the counterparty contagion and information contagion for nancial
rms. Azizpour, Giesecke, and Schwenkler (2017) nd that contagion and rms exposure to
observable and latent systematic factors explain signicant part of clustering.
Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009a) show that CDO senior tranches are inaccurately priced
and that senior tranche investors should have required a higher risk premium than that
indicated by the \unreliable" ratings. The mispricing arises from the economic catastrophe
feature of CDOs and many other structured products that default only under extremely bad
economic states. This default clustering feature in bad economic states acts as an additional
source of risk for senior CDO tranches. Rating agencies, however, ignore this economic
catastrophe feature in practice. Investors therefore should not rely on credit ratings for CDO
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pricing or risk assessment, as the information contained in them is insucient. To correct
the failure of CDO pricing, Coval, Jurek and Staord (2009a) develop a state contingent
framework based on a modied Merton's (1974) structural model.
Coval, Jurek, and Staord (2009b) provide a detailed discussion of the structured products
market and the valuation/rating failure. In addition to the economic catastrophe feature,
as discussed in Coval, Jurek and Staord (2009a), they claim that small model error can
be signicantly magnied by the pooling and tranching structure of structured products.
The model error may arise from an inaccurate assumption for either the default correlation
or default probability of collateral assets. The largest impact can be found in the more
complicated CDO2.
Grin and Nickerson (2017) quantify rating agencies' default correlation assumptions
for structured products before and after the crisis. Although the rating agencies default
correlation assumption has increased from 0.01 to 0.03 after the crisis, it is much lower than
the estimated correlation of 0.12 when we jointly consider the observable and nonobservable
factors. Broer (2017) nd that disagreement about the default correlations increases the value
of structured collateral. Erlenmaier and Gersbach (2014), Bae, Iscoe, and Kim (2015) and
Andreoli, Ballestra, and Pacelli (2016) also explore appropriate ways of estimating the default
correlation and CDO pricing.
In the spirit of DEHS (2009), we use a dynamic-frailty model as the benchmark model
for portfolio loss estimation, which is the foundation for CDO pricing. We depart from
DEHS (2009) by assuming dierent scenarios of the data structure. This can be achieved by
controlling for the data-generating process. We further apply the dynamic-frailty model for
CDO pricing.
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III. The Impact of Model Specication on CDO
Pricing: Simulation Results
CDOs are constructed from a collateral portfolio characterized by collateral credit quality,
maturity and correlation, and the portfolio cash ows are tranched into dierent classes.
Therefore, CDO pricing heavily depends on the accurate assessment of the credit risk of the
collateral portfolio. In this section, we demonstrate the eects of various model specications
on portfolio credit risk assessment and CDO pricing based on simulations. A simulation study
can help elucidate the full picture of model performance. Misspecication of a model leads to
biased estimation and might eventually produce a deected prediction. For example, when
common-frailty-driven defaults are not accounted for, we underestimate the possible extreme
losses of a credit portfolio, which is particularly relevant for CDO senior tranche pricing.
A. Dynamic-frailty Model and Simulation Methods
To assess the model specication eects, we use the dynamic-frailty model in Due, Eckner,
Horel and Saita (2009) as a benchmark good model. As defaults are more clustered than
conventional credit risk models suggest (Das, Due, Kapadia, and Saita (2007)), Due,
Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009) propose a frailty-correlated default model, in which the frailty
factor can be used to technically solve the omitted variable bias. The frailty factor can
be anything that aects a rm's default probability and generates an additional source of
default correlation. Since the frailty factor is not observable and may change with time, we
need to perform Bayesian updating to \learn" the frailty factor from the realized defaults.
For example, after Enron's bankruptcy, people realized that other rms may have similar
accounting problems (i.e., frailty), and adjusted their default estimation accordingly. The
inclusion of the frailty factor and the resulting more accurate default correlation assumptions
is particularly important for portfolio credit risk analysis and CDO senior tranche pricing.
Specically, we assume that the default intensity of rm i at time t takes a proportional
10
hazard specication as
it = (Si(Xt); )
= exp(+   Vt +   Uit + Yt): (1)
where Si(Xt) represents the component of Xt that is relevant to the default intensity of rm
i, and  represents the parameter vector for the default intensity to be estimated. Default
events are driven by three types of factors: observable macroeconomic factors (Vt), including
market-wide stock returns and interest rates; observable rm-specic factors (Uit) such as
a rm's distance-to-default and trailing stock return; and the unobservable common frailty
factor Yt.
12 Following Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009), we further assume that the
unobservable common frailty factor Yt follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process, with the
speed of mean-reversion of  and a standard Brownian motion (B) as the innovations:
dYt =  Ytdt+ dBt: (2)
Conditional independence of default arrivals is regained under the assumption that the frailty
factor may capture additional default clustering. Appendix A provides details regarding
the default intensity parameter estimation. From the frailty module, we can obtain default
probability estimations with both observable and unobservable factors.
To evaluate portfolio credit risk by using the dynamic-frailty model, we rst simulate both
the observable factors and unobservable frailty factor that aect a rm's default intensity
based on a factor time-series model. The number of rms simulated is 2800, and the history
lasts for 25 years.13 To remain in line with the factor dynamics implied in the real historic
data, we employ the same Gaussian rst-order vector autoregressive model for the observable
factors in Due, Saita and Wang (2007) and the same OU process with long-run mean of 0
12It is possible to have a rm-heterogeneous frailty factor Zi. However, Zi is dicult to determine given
the size of the data. Furthermore, its presence does not qualitatively change the signicance of Yt. Therefore,
this unobservable rm heterogeneity is excluded from the nal model for portfolio credit risk evaluation in
Due et al. (2009).
13Due, Saita and Wang (2007) consider 2770 industrial rms for the period from 1980 to 2004.
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for the common frailty factor specied in Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009). The time
step is taken to be one month. We further simulate corporate default time data by using the
Inverse-CDF method oered in Due and Singleton (1999). Appendix B provides a detailed
review of the factor time-series model and the data simulation method, and Appendix C lists
the maximum likelihood parameter estimation of the factor time-series model in Due, Saita
and Wang (2007).
After obtaining the factor time series and default timing data, we insert these simulated
data into the dynamic-frailty model to estimate the default intensity parameters. By ex-
tending the factor time series with the prespecied model, we can evaluate the credit risk
of any portfolio constructed on the underlying rms in our dataset. Through the simulation
analysis, we rst investigate the performance of the dynamic-frailty model in ltering out the
\frailty" factor. The validation test in Appendix D shows that the dynamic-frailty model
can eectively lter out the hypothetical \true" frailty. Motivated by this nding, we then
investigate the performance of the frailty model for portfolio credit risk analysis and CDO
pricing.
B. No-frailty versus Dynamic-frailty Model
Even for single-obligor credit risk modeling, there is no consensus on the best performing
model. Model failure has been recorded in nearly all areas. The seminal work of Vasicek
(1987) on portfolio credit risk is shown to be inaccurate for heterogeneous asset pools. More
seriously, the default correlation is assumed to be driven only by observable factors. This
counterfactual assumption has been widely adopted until recently. However, we believe that
existing almost all CDOs are evaluated based on this low correlation assumption.
To understand to what extent an omitted latent factor might engender CDO mispricing,
we formally conduct an analysis of portfolio default rate prediction with the no-frailty and
dynamic-frailty models. Based on the portfolio default rate distributions, we further conduct
CDO pricing by referring to the SDR of the desired rating. Once the SDR for a desired
tranche rating is available, the tranche size can be determined as no greater than 1-SDR.
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The simulated 25 years of data on observable factors is summarized in Panel A of Table I.
Then, we estimate the default intensity parameters by using the maximum likelihood method
based on the simulated data. The estimated parameters for the no-frailty and dynamic-frailty
models are listed in Panel B of Table I. Subsequently, we form a portfolio with all active rms
at the end of year 25, and predict the portfolio loss distribution with the frailty model and
no-frailty model, respectively. Figure 1 compares the portfolio's default rate distribution for
the next ve years according to the dynamic-frailty and no-frailty models. Panel C of Table
I provides the details of the quantiles of the portfolios default rate distribution. Using the
simulated portfolio as the collateral portfolio, we then investigate the CDO pricing with both
the dynamic-frailty and no-frailty models.
With the estimated distribution of expected portfolio default loss, the CDO tranche must
withstand the SDR of the desired rating. As discussed above, the SDR is the portfolio default
rate for which the default probability exceeding this portfolio default rate is no greater than
that of the historical corporate bond default rate with the same rating. Once the SDR
for a desired tranche rating is available, the tranche size can be determined as no greater
than 1-SDR. For CDO senior tranche pricing, we focus on the tail risk. We determine the
AAA tranche size by referring to the AAA historical default probability. For the ve-year
prediction horizon, the default probability is about 0.1% for a AAA corporate bond. This
default probability corresponds to the SDR for the AAA tranche given by the 0.999 quantile.
However, dierent credit risk models yield dierent quantile values and therefore the model
implied SDR. The higher of the quantile value and SDR, the smaller of the model implied AAA
tranche size (1-SDR). As shown in Table I and Figure 1, the 0.95, 0.99 and 0.999 quantiles
for the dynamic-frailty model prediction are 14.29%, 17.33% and 21.01%, respectively, and
11.66%, 13.41%, and 15.55% for the no-frailty model prediction. If we take the 0.999 quantile
as the SDR for a AAA rating, the AAA tranche size will be 78.99% for the frailty model and
84.45% for the no-frailty model. Therefore, compared to pricing CDOs without the frailty
factor (i.e., the no-frailty model), pricing CDOs with the frailty factor can reduce the AAA
tranche size by 5.46%.
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C. Correlation Between Macroeconomic Factors
The simulation results from the previous section highlight the value of the frailty model for
CDO pricing. In this section, we further consider the impact of correlation between macroe-
conomic factors on CDO pricing in the presence of frailty factor. Specically, we consider a
more realistic model for dependent risk factors that captures the correlation between macroe-
conomic factors. In reality, there might be correlation between macroeconomic factors. For
example, when the market undergoes a crisis, the central bank will step in and cut interest
rates to inject liquidity into the market, which essentially creates a correlation between the
short-term interest rate and stock market performance.14 However, in credit risk models, such
as the frailty model in Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009), interest rates are assumed to
be independent of stock market index trailing returns. Ignoring the additional correlation
between the interest rate and stock market index returns may aect CDO pricing and the
real AAA tranche size.
To investigate the eect of this correlation assumption, we rst impose a correlation (lag
one) between the interest rates and market returns in the factor time-series model used for
the data simulation. Specically, based on the factor time-series model in Appendix B, we
introduce a correlation  between the innovation terms of the 3-month interest rate ("1;t+1)
and S&P 500 trailing returns (t). Historically, the lag one correlation between the innovations
of the 3-month interest rate and S&P 500 returns is about 0.18 for the 10 years from 1997 to
2006. This period represents a time when the CDO market experienced exponential growth.
For illustration purpose, we opt for a higher correlation of 0.3.
Based on the simulated historical time series (with an imposed correlation), we compare
the frailty model prediction with and without the eect of the correlation between macroe-
conomic factors ( equals to 0.3 and 0, respectively). A summary of factor time series is
provided in Table II Panel A. Panel B presents the estimated default intensity parameters
14In this section, we focus on the correlation between short-term interest rate and stock market performance,
which is a more realistic model for dependent risk factors. It's interesting to further investigate the impact
of the monetary policy intervention on derivative pricing. To introduce the intervention in the model, we
may have to consider regime changes (or jumps) in the interest rates depending on the level of simulated (or
realized market returns).
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for the frailty model. Figure 2 shows the portfolio's default rate distribution for the next ve
years according to the dynamic-frailty model with correlated and uncorrelated macro factors.
The quantiles of predicted portfolio default rate are also summarized in Table II Panel C. As
we can see from tail part of Figure 2 and Table II Panel C, the portfolio default rate is only
slightly higher when correlation is considered. The dierences are 0.09%, 0.14% and 0.14%
for the 0.95, 0.99, and 0.999 quantiles, respectively. This result implies that the assumption of
zero correlation between interest rates and stock market returns in the dynamic-frailty model
does not have a signicant eect on the default estimation results. Consequently, the implied
CDO AAA tranche is similar regardless of whether the correlation between macroeconomic
factors is considered.
To sum up, the simulation results in this section suggest that the common frailty factor
aects the predicted portfolio default rate, particularly for the part of the tail that is most
relevant to AAA CDO tranches. In the presence of the frailty factor, the model prediction is
relatively robust to a correlation between macroeconomic factors.
IV. CDO Pricing with the Frailty Model: Empirical
Evidence
In the previous section, we investigate the potential eects of model specication on CDO
valuation by using a simulation method. We conduct a corresponding empirical analysis in
this section. We rst describe our sample CDO data. The empirical method is demonstrated
in a case study. Specically, we perform a credit risk evaluation on CDO AAA tranches by
using both the no-frailty model and dynamic-frailty model. We scrutinize the ability of the
benchmark dynamic-frailty model to predict subsequent downgrading of the senior AAA-rated
CDO tranches over our sample CDOs, and we further discuss the implications of the results
for CDO mispricing.
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A. Data Description
Our sample contains 237 CDOs issued between May 1998 and December 2004.15 The distri-
bution according to collateral asset type is as follows: 46 CBOs, 82 CLOs, 99 ABS CDOs
and 10 CDO2s. We obtain the rst report after the ramp-up of the asset portfolio16 with the
following collateral asset characteristics:
 Closing date (CDate): The date on which a CDO is purchased by investors.
 Weighted average rating (WAR): Average credit rating of the collateral asset portfolio,
weighted by the par amount of each asset.
 Weighted average maturity (WAM): Average maturity of the collateral asset portfolio,
weighted by the par amount.
 Number of obligors (N): Number of distinct obligors for the collateral asset portfolio.
 Default measure (DM): The average expected default rate of collateral assets, weighted by
the par amount and annualized by the average asset maturity.
 Variability measure (VM): The annualized standard deviation of collateral asset default
rates, which measures the dispersion of underlying assets when their correlation is not
considered.
 AAA tranche size (AAA size): The sum of the face values of all AAA-rated tranches of a
CDO divided by the total face value of the CDO.
Table III presents the summary statistics for our sample. We also list the SDRs at the
reporting date for the initial rating and downgrading notches as of October 15, 2009, for
the initially AAA-rated tranches. For downgrading notches, the number 0 denotes never
downgraded, and the numbers 1-19 correspond to downgrading from AAA to AA+ all the
way down to CC. In our sample, we have 16 downgraded CBOs, 53 downgraded CLOs, 85
downgraded ABS CDOs and 7 downgraded CDO2s. The SDR is the required subordinationor
15Our sample period ends in 2004 because of the limited availability of data on the frailty factor. Addi-
tionally, the CDO market has explosive growth with some irregular activities during the 2005-2007 period.
Consequently, nonstructural factors could drive CDO pricing after 2004.
16See internet appendix Figure IA.1 in Grin and Tang (2012) for the discussion of CDO credit rating
timeline.
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the percentage of portfolio loss rate that a CDO tranche at a given rating level must sustain
without causing a cash ow event of default. The probability of default in the asset portfolio
exceeding this percentage is no greater than the historical default probability of corporate
bonds with the same rating. For example, if the portfolio default distribution is the same as
the one with frailty in Figure 1 and if the average realized default probability for a AAA-rated
corporate bond is 0.1%, then the SDR for the AAA tranche is 21.01%, the 0.999 quantile.
Once the SDR for a desired tranche rating is available, the tranche size can be determined
as no greater than 1-SDR. However, in practice, a larger fraction of a AAA tranche can be
achieved through out-of-model adjustments (Grin and Tang (2012)).
B. A Case Study Illustrating the Methodology
We rst illustrate our CDO valuation method via an example case analysis. All 4 types of
CDOs are valuated in a similar way. The chosen CDO is called Independence I. This CDO is
collateralized with various ABS securities, including commercial mortgage-backed securities
(CMBS), residential mortgage-backed security assets (RMBS), ABS, and CDO. Below, we
demonstrate how we evaluate this ABS CDO and how the frailty model generates results that
can predict eventual downgrade.
Independence I is issued by Independence I CDO, Ltd. (a special purpose vehicle registered
in the Cayman Islands) and co-issued by Independence I CDO Inc. (a special purpose vehicle
registered in Delaware).17 The closing date is December 7, 2000, according to Moody's, and
December 12, 2000, according to S&P. Credit Suisse is the lead underwriter and counterparty
for interest rate swap agreements. The collateral manager is Independence Fixed Income
Associates Inc., which was renamed to Declaration Research and Management LLC. in 2003.
From Moody's New Issue Report dated April 13, 2001, the collateral pool is fully ramped in
March 12, 2001 (about 65% complete at the closing date).
Independence I has an initial principle amount of US$300 million with the following capital
structure: Class A rst priority senior secured notes of $223.5 million (74.5%), Class B second
17The Independence series continue to Independence VII issued on March 28, 2006.
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priority senior secured notes of $50 million, Class C Mezzanine secured notes of $15 million,
and a preference share of 11.5 million.18 Moody's initially assigned a AAA rating to the
Class A tranche, followed by the Class B tranche with Aa3, and Class C tranche with Baa2.
Preference shares are not rated. S&P assigned the AAA rating to Class A but did not rate
Class B, Class C and preference shares. Fitch also provided Class A with a AAA rating, Class
B with a AA- rating, and Class C with a BBB rating. Although all three rating agencies
issued a AAA rating to Class A of this CDO, it was subsequently downgraded to AA- rating
on August 30, 2004, and further downgraded to A- on November 16, 2005, by S&P. Fitch
downgraded Class A to A on March 7, 2006 and then to BB on March 9, 2009. Moody's
downgraded Class A to AA2 on February 18, 2005, to Baa2 on February 2, 2007, and further
to B1 and then placed it under review for possible a downgrade on April 22, 2009.
The collateral asset characteristics for Independence I reported on December 26, 2003,
before any downgrade are as follows: the collateral asset portfolio contains 95 assets from 83
obligors, with a weighted average rating of BBB-, a weighted average maturity of 8.45 years,
an average expected asset default rate of 0.0112, and a variability of the default rate of 0.0162.
For the AAA rating of this collateral portfolio, a rating agency derives the SDR of 29.2% by
using a default rate threshold of 0.00608.
When the credit rating or pricing for a CDO is obtained, the collateral pool is typically
incomplete, and rating agencies will conduct an analysis and assign a rating based on the
projected collateral pool characteristics. To price this CDO, we rst generate factor time
series based on the collateral pool characteristics specied above. Then, we insert these factor
time series into the no-frailty model (bad model) and the dynamic-frailty model (good model)
and generate the collateral pool loss distribution. With the collateral pool loss distribution,
we can determine the AAA SDRs by referring to the historical AAA default probability. We
then compare the AAA SDRs and the resulting AAA tranche size from the dierent model
specications (no-frailty vs. frailty model).
Specically, we adopt the parameter estimations of the factor times-series dynamics and
18These numbers are provided by Moody's New Issue Report. S&P record has a preference share size of
$12 million.
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default intensity provided in Due, Saita and Wang (2007) and Due, Eckner, Horel, and
Saita (2009).19 The 3-month treasury bill rate and S&P 500 index are obtained from the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve system and CRSP database, respectively. We
choose the weighted average maturity (WAM) of the CDO as the prediction horizon. We
further assume that each obligor has an equal amount of principal in the asset pool.
We next need the distance to default and asset processes for the 83 obligors of the CDO
collateral pool. We assume the obligor-specic factors starting from its long-run means.
As discussed earlier, collateral pools of CDOs consist of various types of assets, such as
corporate bonds, leveraged loans, sovereign debts, ABS tranches and CDO tranches. Our
exemplicative CDO Independence I comprises 41.8% CMBS, 23% RMBS, 21.4% ABS, and
13.8% CDO assets. It is prohibitive to estimate the distance to default and asset processes
for these complex securitized products. Instead, some rating agencies use the average default
probability of the same rating cohort to proxy for the default probability of the same type of
assets and assume a pairwise correlation among the obligors based on the industry sector and
geographic region. For example, S&P's CDO Evaluator and Fitch's VECTOR determines the
default probability based on asset type, rating and maturity.20 Furthermore, for CBOs and
CLOs, the obligor might be a private rm, and such rating is not even available.
In our study, we do not conduct an obligor-by-obligor estimation for the distance to
default and asset processes. For simplicity and tractability, we make use of the portfolio
average expected default rate (DM) and variability of default rate (VM). We assume that the
default probability of each obligor in the collateral portfolio is log-normally distributed with
a mean DM and a standard deviation of VM taken by the square root of N , the number of
obligors. We choose a log-normal distribution in light of the nonnegative default probabilities
and right-skewed default rate distribution. Then, we equally draw N quantiles of the log-
normal distribution along the interval (0; 1) and assign these quantiles as the default rates of
19The frailty factor estimation is available up to the end of year 2003. For a CDO with a closing date in
the year 2004 (which may have been initiated in 2003), we extend this factor to the date by using the OU
process dynamics starting from the end month of 2003.
20For each asset type, default probabilities across all ratings and for typical maturities are estimated from
historical default data on that specic type. Sometimes, adjusted default probabilities from other asset types
are used when the historical data are scarce for a recent innovation.
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the obligors. Next, the sampled default probability of obligor i, DPi, is transformed into the
targeted distance to default, iD, through the inverse cumulative normal distribution function
 1:
iD =   1(DPi); (3)
For simplicity, we assume that the long-run mean of the assets of each obligor is uniformly
distributed on some quartile range of the asset values, as estimated in Bharath and Shumway
(2008). Specically, for CBOs, we choose the uppermost quartile, 6.3-10.0, given that CBOs
mostly comprise bonds issued by relative large-cap companies. For CLOs, we choose the 0.25-
0.5 quartile, 3.3-4.7, since most underlying assets of CLOs are leveraged loans from small and
median-sized rms. For ABS CDOs and CDO2s, we do not have an established basis to
choose a particular asset span and simply use the interquartile range, 3.3-6.3.21 Empirical
evidence in Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Fama and French
(2002) shows that larger rms tend to have higher leverage. Thus, we assign in reverse order
the long-run means of assets to the targeted distance to default for each obligor. Accordingly,
a larger obligor in our sample has a lower targeted distance to default.
Given the assumption that obligor-specic factors start from their long-run means, we
apply the no-frailty model and dynamic-frailty model to generate the collateral pools default
rate distribution for each CDO and determine the SDRs accordingly. The results are provided
in Table III. For Independence I, the SDR is 29.2% according to the rating agency model,
25.3% according to the no-frailty model, and 51.8% according to the dynamic-frailty model.
Theoretically, the AAA tranche size is given by the 1-SDR. Therefore, while the SDRs ac-
cording to both the rating agency model and the no-frailly model allow a AAA tranche of
more than 70% for this CDO, the dynamic-frailty model with an advanced default correlation
assumption allows a much smaller AAA tranche of 48.2%.
In the above analysis, we use the historical AAA default probability to determine the SDR
and the AAA tranche size from the collateral pool loss distribution. In other words, we x
the AAA default probability and compare the model-implied AAA tranche size. In our data
21For ABS CDOs and CDO2s, our SDR prediction is not sensitive to the asset span when it is shifted down
to the lower interquartile 0.4-4.7 or up to the upper interquartile 4.7-10.0.
20
set, we also observe the real AAA tranche size. Then, instead of xing the default probability
and comparing the model-implied tranche size, we can also compare the model-implied \real"
default probability of this real AAA tranche size. Specically, we construct a variable default
probability (DPi) for CDO i as:
DPi = ProbfDefault Rate > Attachment Pointg (4)
Theoretically, the corresponding default probability for the AAA tranche size should be the
AAA default probability (DPAAA;i). However, dierent models yield dierent portfolio default
rate estimation. The AAA tranche size from the credit rating agency model does not necessary
gives the AAA default probability according to the no-frailty and/or dynamic-frailty models.
With the real AAA tranche size in our dataset, we would like to examine the corresponding
default probability for this AAA tranche size in the no-frailty model (DPNF;i) and dynamic-
frailty model (DPDF;i). The larger deviation between DPDF;i and DPAAA;i (i.e., DPDF;i-
DPAAA;i), the higher risk of this AAA tranche as estimated by the dynamic-frailty model.
A similar argument can be made for the DPNF;i-DPAAA;i. For our case Independence I, the
DPNF;i andDPDF;i equal 0.4% and 20.7%, respectively. Given that theDPAAA;i equals 0.61%,
the default probability of the Independence I AAA tranche is much higher according to the
dynamic-frailty model estimation. Note that the Class A tranche with an initial AAA rating
from all three rating agencies is eventually downgraded to a BB credit rating.
C. AAA Tranche Size from the Frailty and No-Frailty Models
The estimated SDRs from the no-frailty model and dynamic-frailty model for each CDOs are
presented in Table III and Figure 3. For comparison, we also provide the SDRs by rating
agency. Table IV summarizes the real AAA tranche size, and the empirical results for average
SDR according to the rating agency model, no-frailty model, and dynamic-frailty model. The
last two columns in Table IV provide the average implied default probability of the real AAA
tranche size from the no-frailty model and the dynamic-frailty model, respectively.
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As we can see from Tables III, IV and Figure 3, the SDRs from the no-frailty model are
highly correlated with those from the rating agency model. Specically, the correlation is
0.91 for CBOs, 0.89 for CLOs, 0.87 for ABS CDOs and 0.57 for CDO2. Compared with the
no-frailty model, the rating agency model gives higher SDRs, on average. In particular, the
SDRs from the rating agency model are 9% higher for CBOs, 7% higher for CLOs, 4.1%
higher for ABS CDOs and 10.3% higher for CDO2. Therefore, on average, the rating agency
model yelled a smaller AAA tranche size than the no-frailly model. However, when the frailty
factor is considered, the SDRs from the rating agency model underestimate CBOs by 12%,
CLOs by 15%, ABS CDOs by 13% and CDO2 by 5%, on average. Across all the 237 CDOs in
the sample, the dynamic-frailty model predicts SDRs that are, on average, 13% higher than
predicted by the rating agency model, while the no-frailty model predicts 6% lower SDRs
than the dynamic-frailty model.
According to our empirical results, if we only consider observable factors for our portfolio
credit risk evaluation, the SDRs according to rating agencies, which are the primary deter-
minants of the assigned rating, overestimated the portfolio risk for all four types of CDOs,
on average. For CDO2s, the overestimation is most prominent. Once the additional source of
risk, the common frailty factor that systematically aects the whole economy, is taken into
account, the risks of all 4 types of CDOs are underestimated by the SDRs from the rating
agency model. ABS CDOs are most directly related to the subprime mortgage crisis, and
they have experienced widespread downgradings even for AAA-rated tranches. Of the 99
ABS CDO in our sample, 85 have been downgraded by one or more rating agencies, and 16
and 53 downgrades are recorded for the 46 CBOs and 82 CLOs, respectively, in our sample.
The dynamic-frailty model predicts the large risk underestimation, over 10% for CBOs and
CLOs. The frailty factor is thus important for understanding the risks embedded in AAA
tranches, as it decreases the AAA tranche size by about 19% when added to the model.
D. Downgrading Prediction
We further conduct a downgrading prediction study with respect to the 237 CDOs in our
sample. We rst separate the CDOs into 10 risk groups according to dierence between the
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implied default probability of the real AAA tranche from the frailty model (DPDF;i) and
the AAA default probability (DPAAA;i) , i.e., DPDF;i   DPAAA;i. Group 1 represents the
lowest risk group, and group 10 represents the highest risk group predicted by the frailty
model. Then, we compare the percentage of CDOs downgraded in each of the risk groups.
Similarly, we can compare the downgrading prediction power of the no-frailty model using
the deviation of DPNF;i DPAAA;i. As shown in Figure 4, when we use the frailty model, the
average rate of downgrades for CDOs in the lowest risk category is 29%, whereas the average
downgrading rate is 92% in the highest risk group. Although the frailty model is not perfect
and indeed there is no monotonic pattern in the gure22, the monotonicity is much more
visible for frailty model than the no-frailty model. In Figure 4, we have also shown the risk
classication and downgrading prediction based on the rating agency's SDR. The SDRs from
rating agency produce a dierent pattern, which is consistent with Grin and Tang (2012).
Overall, although the frailty model is not perfect, it shows power in separating out the safest
and riskiest CDOs and predicting the future CDO downgrading compared to no-frailty and
rating agencys SDRs.
To further investigate the power of the frailty model in predicting the future AAA tranche
downgrading, we have conducted the following regression analysis. Since higher default prob-
ability denotes more risk, the AAA tranche is expected to be downgraded to a lower credit
rating when the deviation between the default probability for the real AAA tranche size from
the frailty model (good model) and no-frailty model (bad model) is higher. We thus conduct
an ordered probit regression of the AAA tranche downgraded notches on the risk proxy DP
and a set of controls and a CDO type dummy. The results are presented in Table V. The
downgrading notches are regressed on the default probability for the real AAA tranche size
from the dynamic-frailty model (DPDF ), the default probability for real AAA tranche size
from the no-frailty model (DPNF ), the dierence between default probability with and with-
out frailty (DPDF   DPNF ). We also include a set of controls for the CDO characteristics,
including the weighted average maturity (WAM), default measure (DM), variance measure
22The imperfect of frailty model is consistent with Azizpour, Giesecke, and Schwenkler (2017) who establish
the presence of excess clustering in the default data that cannot be explained by rms' joint exposure to
observable and latent systematic factors.
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(VM), number of obligors (Obl), interest rate (rf ), S&P 500 Return (S&P 500), Dummy
CLO, Dummy ABS and Dummy CDO2.
We expect the coecients on default probability to be positive and signicant, which
would support the prediction power of the model. For the 237 CDOs, the coecient for
DPDF equals 3.37, and it is 3.53 for the default probability without frailty DPNF . The
coecient for DPDF continues to be positive when both DPDF and DPNF are included in
the regression. When the dierence in default probabilities between the frailty and no-frailty
models (DPDF   DPNF ) is used as an independent variable, its coecient is positive and
signicant even after we include the DPNF or other control variables, as shown in models 3, 4
and 6. The R2 for these regressions is 9.97%, on average. Therefore, the frailty model exhibits
prediction power for the subsequent AAA CDO downgrading. The power of the frailty model
is further evidenced by the regression result that the deviation between frailty and no-frailty
model (DPDF  DPNF ) signicantly predicts downgrading.
E. Implications for CDO Mispricing
The previous analyses suggest that when the good model (frailty model) is used for CDO
pricing, we will obtain a much smaller AAA tranche size. The good model has the power to
capture the excess default clustering, which is particularly important for CDO AAA tranche
pricing. The dierences in model outputs from the good and the bad model even have
prediction power for the subsequent CDO downgrades. Therefore, model specication plays
an important role in obtaining the true price for CDO. However, does the model specication
(or model error) explain the entire CDO mispricing that we observed before the crisis?
The development and adoption of new nancial models, which provide a simple way to
quantify the risks in the complicated CDO collateral pool, indeed boosted the explosive growth
of the CDO market. Observing the limits of these nancial models during the recent crisis,
some market participants tend to blame the quants and their models for \killing the Wall
Street".23 However, as stated by the rating agency \ratings are ultimately the result of a
23see, e.g., \Recipe for disaster: The formula that killed Wall Street", Wired, February 23, 2009.
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formal committee process and not simply model output" (Fitch (2006)). Mispricing may be
attributed to both the model error (due to model specications) and the errors out of the
model (due to human factors). Even when the true model is used for CDO pricing (zero model
error), mispricing can exist if there are errors out of the model. In particular, when we target
a particular level of AAA tranche size, the subjective out-of-model adjustment yields identical
AAA tranche sizes across CDOs, irrespective of the model outputs. The role of subjective
adjustment is conrmed by Grin and Tang (2012), who nd evidence that CDOs with
a smaller model-implied AAA size receive larger adjustments and subsequently experience
more severe downgrading. In this setting, although model specication is important for
nding the true price, errors out of the model play a key role in explaining CDO mispricing.
Understanding the roles of both model specication and out-of-model errors is important for
avoiding future pricing errors in the CDO and other nancial markets.
In addition, Coval, Pan, and Staord (2014) show that capital markets develop blind
spots when nancial models are misapplied in real world capital markets. The emergence and
persistence of the blind spots arise because the relatively sophisticated market participants
fail to notice the state-contingent model errors. They rely upon learning rules (and research
methodologies) that have little power to reject their model in economically benign states, and
they are forced to adjust their model only after the learning event, such as a crisis. However,
one looking for state-contingent model errors prior to the learning event would have found
reliable evidence. Therefore, even when model errors exist, mispricing can be less severe
if market participants have developed a better understanding for the nature of the error.
Our paper provides a good framework for analyzing model specication and its impact on
derivative pricing, which will likely continue and appear repeatedly.
V. Conclusion
One of the most remarkable episodes of the 2007-2009 credit crisis is the widespread down-
grading of top-rated (often AAA) CDO securities and overwhelming write-downs resulting
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from CDO revaluation. In this paper, we analyze the structural causes of CDO mispricing,
and our simulation results suggest that model misspecication aects CDO valuation. The
frailty default factor identied by Due, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009) is especially impor-
tant in accurately measuring the default correlation. As ignoring the frailty factor can inate
the AAA tranche of a CDO, the AAA-rated tranche would have been rated much lower had
the deal structurers and rating agencies considered the frailty factor and used more advanced
model at the time of deal origination.
We conduct an empirical analysis on 237 CDOs issued between May 1998 and December
2004. Our no-frailty model obtains a CDO portfolio default rate at the AAA level that is
close to rating agency estimates for CLOs and ABS CDOs. However, compared with ignoring
frailty, considering the frailty factor raises the AAA portfolio default rate. Furthermore,
the increase in relative risk for ABS CDOs, which experienced the most AAA downgrades
during the credit crisis in our sample, can predict future downgrades. Hence, the information
content in the frailty factor is qualitatively important. However, out-of-model adjustments
play an important role in CDO pricing, with smaller model-implied AAA sizes receiving
larger adjustments (Grin and Tang (2012)). Considering out-of-model adjustments, model
constraints have a modest quantitative eect in explaining the entire CDO mispricing.
The CDO market, especially the segment of CLOs, has come back strong with issuance
amounts surpassing the precrisis peak. Hence, understanding the pricing of CDO is useful
for future regulatory policies and risk management strategies, as future nancial innovations
will likely be accompanied by similar issues regarding model specication and data quality.
The frailty model and Bayesian estimation approach discussed in this paper will be useful for
portfolio credit risk analysis, as default data are scarce. Prior beliefs can shape the result in
signicant ways. Exploring the economic sources of the frailty factor and formation of prior
belief about default correlation is thus a promising area for future research.
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Appendices
A Parameter Estimation
The parameter estimation approach follows Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009). Speci-
cally, in the dynamic-frailty model, the likelihood of the data at the parameters (; ) is given
by
L(; jW;Y;D)
= L(jW )L(jW;Y;D)
= L(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However, given that Yt is not observable to the econometrician, the likelihood is then
L(; jW;D)
=
Z
L(; jW; y;D)pY (y)dy
= L(jW )
Z
L(jW; y;D)pY (y)dy
= L(jW )E[
mY
i=1
(e 
PTi
t=ti
itt
TiY
t=ti
[Dititt+ (1 Dit)])jW;D]: (6)
where Di is the vector of default indicators. That is, for company i, Di = 0 before default and
1 upon default. pY (y) represents the unconditional probability density of the unobservable
common factor Y. Here, we assume that Y is independent of W .
For the estimation of the default intensity parameter , a combination of Markov chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) and the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm is employed. This
combination oers advantages for maximum likelihood parameter estimation in the model
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with incomplete information. The detailed steps include:
Step 1. Obtain the maximum likelihood estimator of the intensity model with only observ-
able covariates ^. This estimator is the MLE from equation (5) when the eect of unobservable
covariate Y is not considered.
Step 2. Assign an initial estimate value for , as suggested by Due, Eckner, Horel and
Saita (2009), at (0) = (^; 0:05; 0).
Step 3. Draw n independent sample paths for the frailty factor Y (1); : : : ; Y (n) from
pY (jW;D; l), which is the conditional density of Y's OU process. This can be done with
MCMC, specically the Gibbs sampler, while taking the lth estimate value for l as well as
the observable covariates W and D as given.
Step 4. Maximization step. Dene the intermediate quality
Q(; (l)) = E(l)(logL(jW;Y;D))
=
Z
logL(jW; y;D)pY (yjW;D; (l)) dy (7)
Based on the sample path for Y drawn in step 3, Q(; (l)) can be approximated by
Q^(; (l)) =
1
n
nX
j=1
logL(jW;Y (j); D) (8)
Then, the new parameter estimate (l+1) can be obtained by
Max Q^(; (l)) =Max
1
n
nX
j=1
logL(jW;Y (j); D) (9)
Step 5. Return to step 3, and replace (l) with the new estimator (l+1). Proceed to step 4
to obtain (l+2). Repeats step 3 and 4 until the estimation of  reaches reasonable convergence.
The asymptotic standard errors for the parameter estimators can be calculate from the
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Hessian matrix of the expected complete-data likelihood.
B Data Simulation Method
To assess the eects of the model specication on portfolio credit risk assessment and CDO
pricing, we simulate a series of data structures. The number of rms simulated is 2800, and
the history lasts for 25 years. To remain in line with the factor dynamics implied in the
real historic data, we employ the same Gaussian rst-order vector autoregressive model for
the observable factors in Due, Saita and Wang (2007) and the same OU process with a
long-run mean of 0 for the common frailty factor specied in Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita
(2009). The time step is taken to be one month. Here, we provide a brief review of this factor
time-series model.
A simple arbitrage-free two-factor ane term-structure model is specied for the three-
month treasury rates (r1t) and 10-year treasury rates (r2t).
rt+1 = rt + kr(r   rt) + Cr"t+1; (10)
where r is the long-run mean of interest rates, Cr is a 2  2 matrix, and "1; "2 : : : are
independent standard normal vectors.
For the rm-specic factors of distance to default Dit and log-assets Vit and the trailing
1-year S&P 500 return,24
24Di;t+1
Vi;t+1
35 =
24Dit
Vit
35+
24 kD 0
0 kV
350@24 iD
iV
35 
24Dit
Vit
351A
+
24 b  (r   rt)
0
35+
24D 0
0 V
35 i;t+1; (11)
24Firm asset value is determined by using the Merton's model. For more details, refer to Merton (1974)
and Vassaulou and Xing (2004).
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St+1 = St + ks(s   St) + t+1; (12)
where iD, iV are the long-run means for rm i's distance to default and log assets, respec-
tively. it is the two-dimensional innovation vector.
The correlation among the observable factors is modeled as
i;t = Azit +Bwt;
t = Sut + Swt; (13)
where zit and wt are independent two-dimensional standard normal vectors and ut are inde-
pendent standard normals.
For tractability and parsimony, the mean-reverting speed kD of the distance to default
is assume to be homogeneous across all rms. The distance to default is an asset volatility-
adjusted measure of leverage, and its volatility D does not vary by rm, as implied by
Merton's theory. Asset volatility V and its mean-reverting speed kV are also assumed to be
homogeneous across rms. However, a common targeted leverage ratio leads to an unrealistic
estimated term structure of future default probabilities. Due, Saita andWang (2007) instead
estimate iD rm by rm, with the cross-sectional distribution displayed in gure 12 of their
paper. In our simulation study, we load the long-run means of distance to default and log
assets for each rm in the following way.
As reported in Due, Saita and Wang (2007), the estimated iD across the whole rm set
has a median of 3.1, with an interquartile range of 1.4-4.8. A careful inspection of gure 12
reveals that the interval 0.0-8.0 of iD covers most of the rms except those at the extreme
lower or upper tail of the distribution. Within this interval, iD is approximately linear
to the rank of rm i, which means that iD might be uniformly distributed on this range.
Accordingly, we parameterize iD as
iD s U(0:0; 8:0); (14)
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where U denotes the uniform distribution.
The long-run means of log assets are not reported in Due, Saita and Wang (2007).
Here, we turn to Bharath and Shumway (2008), who apply a similar estimation procedure
and provide the quartiles of estimates for an augmented rm set.25 The reported asset value
ranges from 1.52 to 22949.32 (log asset value ranges from 0.4 to 10.0).26 For simplicity, we
assume in our simulation that iV is uniformly distributed on this interval:
iV s U(0:4; 10:0): (15)
To generate time series for the observable factors, we need to make further assumptions of
the starting value of the factor processes and the entry time of each rm. Following common
practice, all factors are assumed to start at their long-run means. We are left with roughly
1400 active rms at the end of the data period after subtracting the number of defaults
and merger-acquisitions from the total number of rms in Due, Saita and Wang (2007).27
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) provide the average number of active rms in each
year from 1963 to 2003 in a lager data set. This number increases from 4342 in 1980 to 7833
in 2003. Proportional to this growth rate, in the simulation, we assume that 800 rms exist
at the beginning of the data period. The other 2000 rms enter evenly in the following 25
years.
Once time series for distance to default and log assets are available, we can determine the
face value of debt (Lt) and market value of equity (Wt) of each rm i by sequentially solving
25Due, Saita and Wang (2007) consider 2770 industrial rms for the period from 1980 to 2004, with 497
defaults identied. Bharath and Shumway (2008) examine all rms in the intersection of the Compustat
Industrial le|Quarterly data and CRSP daily stock returns for NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ for the period
between 1980 and 2003, excluding nancial rms. They obtain total 1449 defaults.
26Winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles by Bharath and Shumway (2008).
27We do not exclude \other exits" since most exists of this type are various data gaps.
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the following two equations. Let Vt denotes asset value at time t; then
Dt =
ln(Vt=Lt) + (A   122V )T
V
p
T
; (16)
Wt = Vt(d1)  Lte rT(d2); (17)
where d1 =
ln(Vt=Lt)+(r+
1
2
2V )T
V
p
T
, d2 = d1   A
p
T , () is the standard normal cumulative
distribution function. r is the risk-free interest rate measured as the 3-month treasury rate.
We assume a forecast horizon of 12 months. We avoid solving for the asset volatility in
virtue of the assumption of their homogeneity across all rms as specied in equation (11). Its
value is xed at the maximum likelihood estimate of 0.1169. Some scholars provide various
approaches to estimate the expected asset drift rate A.
28 In this paper, we deviate from all
these methods by using the mean-reversion property of the log assets process. We calculate
V as the expected mean-reversion during the next period.
V   1
2
2V = kV (V   ln(Vt)) (18)
Inserting V and V into equation (16), we can directly derive the debt value Lt. The time
series for a rm's market equity follows from the call-option pricing formula as stated in
equation (17). It is unrealistic to assume a constant level of face value of debt in a time
period as long as 25 years. Combining the assumptions of leverage targeting and mean-
reverting asset process, we allow a rm to dynamically adjust their outstanding debt, as
suggested by Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001).29
Now, we come to the determination of the exit time for each rm. There are three major
types of exits dened in Due, Saita and Wang (2007): defaults, merger-acquisition and
\other exits". Each type of exit will not restrict the intensity parameter estimation of the
28Vassalou and Xing (2004) calculate rm-specic average returns on each stock. Bharath and
Shumway(2008) estimate previous year asset returns. Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) use 0.06, an
empirical proxy for equity premium, plus the risk-free rate as an estimate.
29Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001) and Due, Saita and Wang (2007) show that dynamic debt adjust-
ment and leverage targeting could generate a more realistic term structure of default probabilities.
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other types.30 Since \other exits" are mostly data gaps of various types, they are less relevant
for our study, and we exclude them for simplicity. As argued in Due, Saita and Wang (2007),
merger-acquisitions have relatively little eect on the default hazard rate, and future default
does not have to be prevented in merger-acquisitions if debts are not paid back immediately.
Here, we do not consider merger-acquisition exits either.
We calculate the default intensity as
it = e
+1Dit+2Rit+3rt+4St+yt ; (19)
where Rit is the trailing 1-year stock return. (; ) = (-1.029, -1.201, -0.646, -0.255, 1.556),
the real data estimates reported in Table II of Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009). A
hypothetic frailty path, which remains latent in reality, is generated with a mean-reverting
speed of 0.03 and volatility of 0.15, which are derived from the marginal frailty parameter
posterior distribution in Figure 6 in Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009).
For rm i, the conditional probability of survival from entry time ti to some future time
si before the data cuto date Ti is given by
pi(ti; si) = e
 Psit=ti itt (20)
t equals one month.
The default time is simulated by using the Inverse-CDF method oered in Due and
Singleton (1999). For each rm i, we draw a uniform random number U . Default time  is
determined as
 = inffsi : pi(ti; si)  U; ti  si  Tig (21)
If pi(ti; Ti) > U , the rm never defaults in our data period.
30See Proposition 2 of Due, Saita and Wang (2007).
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Now, we can insert our factor time series and default timing data into the frailty model to
estimate the default intensity parameters. By extending the factor time series with the pre-
specied model, we can evaluate the credit risk of any portfolio constructed on the underlying
rms in our data set.
C Correlation Structure of Observable Factors
This appendix lists the factor time-series models estimated by Due, Saita and Wang (2007).
kr =
0@ 0:03  0:021
  0:027 0:034
1A ; r =
0@ 3:59
5:47
1A ;
Cr =
0@ 0:5639 0
0:2247 0:2821
1A ;
b = (0:0090   0:0121)0; kD = 0:0355; D = 0:346
kV = 0:015; V = 0:1169
AA0 +BB0 =
0@ 1 0:448
0:448 1
1A ; BB0 =
0@ 0:448 0:0338
0:0338 0:0417
1A ;
kS = 0:1137; S = 0:047; S = 0:1076;
S = (0:0366 0:0134)
0:
D Validation Tests
As shown in Figure 5 of Due, Eckner, Horel and Saita (2009), the latent factor plays a
crucial role in the tail of the probability density of the predicted number of defaults in the
next 5 years. A common source of the current level of and future level of shocks to this latent
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factor enlarges the risk of heavily clustered defaults remarkably. Thus, the ltered-out latent
factor path and the mean-reverting speed, , and volatility, , which govern its time-series
dynamics, are of importance for assessing the modeled correlation risk. Maximum likelihood
estimates of the default intensity parameters converge to the true data-generating process
when the number of rms and number of time periods become large. It is thus helpful to do
some convergence tests rst when working with limited real data.
According to the doubly stochastic assumption, estimation of the factor time series model
could be separated from estimation of the default intensity parameters. We focus on default
intensity estimation and also check the posterior distribution of the ltered frailty factor
through Bayesian analysis. Using the simulation approach described in the previous section,
we simulate one set of the observable macroeconomic factors and rm-specic factors, as well
as one hypothetical frailty path. Then, 100 times, we draw a new U , the default trigger, for
each rm and let the default time be determined accordingly. This process corresponds to 100
dierent realizations of the rm-default history. The maximum number of defaults recorded
is 648, and the minimum is 573. We then estimate the frailty model for each realization.
We nd that the mean ltered frailty paths tightly follow the \true" frailty path. The
correlation between ltered frailty and \true" frailty ranges from 0.87 to 0.96, and the esti-
mated intensity parameter is close to the true data-generating process. Further, the root mean
square error of the estimated intensity parameter is moderate and of similar magnitude to the
standard error of the parameter estimation provided in Table II in Due, Eckner, Horel and
Saita (2009). It is relatively safe to conclude that the model appropriately identies the in-
tangible risk embedded in the latent frailty factor and that the intensity parameter estimation
is not likely to be heavily skewed given the available 25 years of rm-default history.
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Figure 1: Portfolio default rate distribution with and without frailty factor. The condi-
tional probability density of default rate within 5 years, for the portfolio formed by all active rms
at the 25th-year end, from (a) no-frailty model (solid line), (b) dynamic-frailty model (dashed line).
We apply Gaussian kernel smoothing (with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-Carlo generated empirical
distribution.
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Figure 2: Portfolio default rate distribution with and without correlation between
macroeconomic factors. The conditional probability density of default rate within 5 years, for
the portfolio formed by all active rms at the 25th-year end, in (a) a model with positively correlated
short term interest rate and stock market performance (solid line), (b) a model without such corre-
lation (dashed line). We apply Gaussian kernel smoothing (with bandwidth 5) to the Monte-Carlo
generated empirical distribution.
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Table I
No-frailty Model versus Dynamic-frailty Model
This table reports the default rate predictions from the no-frailty model and the dynamic-frailty model.
Panel A reports summary statistics for the simulated 25 years data of observable factors used for parameter
estimation. Panel B reports the Maximum likelihood estimates of default intensity parameters with and
without frailty, respectively. Panel C presents the percentiles of predicted portfolio loss distribution using
both the frailty and the no-frailty models. The portfolio includes all active rms at the end of simulated year
25. Then we compare the portfolio's future ve years default rate distributions from the frailty and no-frailty
models. Total number of rms alive at the beginning of the prediction is 2170.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Quantiles
Variable Mean Std. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
distance to default 4.70 2.46 -3.40 2.81 4.76 6.59 12.86
trailing stock return(%) 13.98 72.01 -81.70 -29.11 -1.07 37.15 317.76
3-month T-bill rate 5.11 1.56 1.62 4.01 5.10 6.03 10.52
trailing S&P 500 return(%) 10.37 13.90 -24.59 0.35 9.12 20.54 47.44
Panel B: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
With frailty Without frailty
Coecient t-statistic Coecient t-statistic
constant -1.046 -5.4 -0.828 -5.1
distance to default -1.115 -31.8 -1.070 -30.3
trailing stock return -0.732 -7.2 -0.812 -7.5
3-month T-bill rate -0.253 -7.3 -0.325 -10.7
trailing S&P 500 return 1.756 5.9 1.538 5.1
latent-factor volatility  0.147 10.3
latent-factor mean reversion  0.029 5.1
Panel C: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
with frailty(%) 4.61 5.81 8.48 12.86 14.29 17.33 21.01
without frailty(%) 4.06 5.16 7.47 10.69 11.66 13.41 15.55
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Table II
Correlation Between Macroeconomic Factors
This table reports the impact of correlation between macroeconomic factors on default rate prediction. Panel A
reports summary statistics for the simulated 25 years data of observable factors used for parameter estimation.
Panel B reports the Maximum likelihood estimates of default intensity parameters. Panel C presents the
percentiles of predicted default rate distribution. Total number of rms alive at the beginning of the prediction
is 2150.
Panel A: Summary statistics
Quantiles
Variable Mean Std. Min 0.25 Median 0.75 Max
distance to default 4.72 2.41 -3.27 2.92 4.78 6.54 13.68
trailing stock return(%) 15.28 71.82 -88.16 -27.78 0.12 38.47 475.37
3-month T-bill rate 5.16 1.77 0.99 3.90 5.13 6.43 9.46
trailing S&P 500 return(%) 11.21 13.37 -19.05 0.81 11.54 21.21 53.12
Panel B: Maximum likelihood estimates of intensity parameters
Coecient Std. Error t-statistic
constant -0.998 0.176 -5.7
distance to default -1.176 0.035 -33.3
trailing stock return -0.618 0.092 -6.7
3-month T-bill rate -0.256 0.032 -8.0
trailing S&P 500 return 1.451 0.343 4.2
latent-factor volatility  0.161 0.019 8.3
latent-factor mean reversion  0.027 0.005 5.5
Panel C: Percentiles of predicted default rate distribution
0.05 0.15 0.50 0.90 0.95 0.99 0.999
with correlation eect(%) 1.63 2.33 4.19 7.91 9.35 12.47 16.42
without correlation eect(%) 1.63 2.33 4.19 7.91 9.26 12.33 16.28
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Table III:
Empirical Results for Scenario Default Rate Prediction
This table reports CDOs' weighted average rating (WAR); closing date(CDate); weighted average maturity
(WAM); number of obligers (N); scenario default rate (%) from (a) rating agency (SDR), (b) no-frailty model
(SDR NF), (c) dynamic-frailty model (SDR DF); default probability from (a) no-frailty model (DP NF), (b)
dynamic-frailty model (DP DF); Notches for AAA tranche downgrading (DG). Averages of the SDRs are
provide at the bottom of the tables for each CDO type.
Panel A: CBO
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF DG
BEA 1998-1 98/05 CCC 4.1 96 58.7 40.9 62.5 11.4 31.3 19
Conseco 98/08 BBB- 4.6 124 15.8 15.3 28.4 0.0 0.1 0
Juniper 1999-1 99/03 CCC+ 4.9 101 49.7 38.6 62.4 2.7 23.3 0
Federated 1999 99/03 B+ 3.7 119 28.1 21.8 37.0 0.0 0.7 0
Emerald 99/05 BB 3.4 120 18.0 15.9 30.0 0.1 6.3 0
Cedar 99/06 B+ 3.9 136 35.2 24.4 41.2 0.0 1.1 0
KNIGHT 99/06 BB+ 3.6 135 18.8 14.8 29.6 6.8 28.5 0
Admiral 99/08 CCC 4.9 76 58.3 42.1 61.8 0.1 6.4 0
INA 1999-1 99/09 B- 4.8 88 47.1 34.1 59.1 1.4 19.6 0
Talcott Notch I 99/10 B- 5.2 146 42.1 33.8 54.3 21.9 48.3 0
FC III 99/11 B 3.5 42 42.6 26.2 45.2 0.1 4.0 0
Centennial 99/12 B+ 4.4 141 36.2 23.4 41.2 0.0 0.2 0
Triton IV 99/12 A- 6.8 117 18.8 12.8 25.6 0.0 0.1 0
Inner Harbor 1999-1 99/12 B+ 5.4 157 37.5 26.1 45.2 0.4 11.6 0
Juniper 2000-1 00/04 B 5.5 107 42.0 30.8 51.4 9.9 37.5 0
Arlington Street 00/06 B+ 5.5 107 40.4 27.1 46.7 0.0 1.2 9
CAESAR 2000 00/06 BB+ 1.2 14 33.1 21.4 21.4 0.0 0.0 0
Wilbraham 00/07 B 5.5 101 44.7 31.7 54.5 0.8 15.4 0
JWS 2000-1 00/07 B+ 5.7 118 40.7 27.1 47.5 0.0 2.4 0
Coliseum 00/07 BB+ 4.9 91 20.7 19.8 37.6 1.0 14.0 1
Madison Ave. I 00/08 B+ 5.7 120 37.8 29.2 51.7 0.2 12.2 0
Nicholas-Applegate I 00/08 B+ 5.5 65 39.8 29.2 52.3 0.0 6.5 10
Chartwell I 00/09 B 5.8 88 43.1 34.1 60.2 19.5 54.3 15
Capstan 00/11 B 5.6 64 46.6 32.8 56.9 0.2 12.8 0
Lone Star 00/12 BBB- 5.5 106 17.2 18.9 39.2 2.6 31.9 0
Blue Eagle I 00/12 B 3.9 20 58.0 40.0 65.0 2.1 16.2 0
Signature 5 00/12 BB- 3.4 104 41.5 20.2 41.3 0.0 2.4 2
Berkeley Street 01/03 B+ 5.8 128 38.1 28.9 55.5 0.0 9.7 10
Liberty Square I 01/03 B+ 6.1 106 39.1 28.3 57.5 0.1 20.3 2
Madison Ave.II 01/03 BBB- 5.1 107 16.9 17.8 39.3 0.3 20.8 6
Hampden 01/03 BBB- 4.9 139 16.1 16.5 40.3 0.1 17.1 0
Centurion III 01/03 B+ 5.4 202 35.6 27.7 57.4 0.0 7.6 0
Canyon 2001-1 01/04 B 5.9 143 41.4 32.2 57.0 1.9 33.3 0
Nicholas-Applegate II 01/04 B+ 5.9 72 38.4 30.6 54.2 3.5 35.0 10
Mammoth 2001-1 01/05 B+ 5.9 129 38.5 28.7 53.5 35.4 65.2 0
Liberty Square II 01/05 B+ 6.2 106 38.8 27.4 52.0 0.1 11.6 4
Balboa I 01/06 BB+ 6.6 120 22.3 24.2 45.8 15.7 54.1 0
Melchior I 01/07 B+ 5.4 87 40.3 29.9 52.9 0.1 7.0 0
Concerto II 01/07 B+ 6.1 97 41.3 33.0 57.7 0.1 11.1 0
Robeco II 01/08 BB- 6.3 129 34.1 29.1 55.0 0.9 28.5 1
TCW 01/08 B+ 6.1 139 38.9 30.2 56.8 0.0 5.2 0
Cashel Rock 01/11 B+ 5.5 101 38.5 28.7 52.5 2.6 32.8 3
(Continued)
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Panel A-Continued
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF DG
Signature 6 01/12 B+ 5.5 115 41.5 28.7 51.3 1.3 20.4 1
Cardinal 02/09 BBB- 5.9 71 18.7 23.9 40.8 6.0 26.3 0
Canyon Capital 2002-1 02/12 B+ 6.3 131 35.4 32.1 51.9 23.9 48.3 9
Prado 03/11 B- 4.7 44 57.7 38.6 59.1 0.2 6.8 9
Average 36.6 27.6 48.7 3.8 18.5
Panel B: CLO
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF DG
Highland Legacy 99/08 B- 4.55 223 42.0 29.1 48.6 1.1 17.6 0
First Dominion III 99/12 B 4.78 187 42.4 28.3 49.7 2.3 21.9 0
Longhorn 00/03 BB- 4.99 129 29.1 22.5 44.2 0.0 2.2 0
Addison 00/10 B+ 5.33 162 33.7 25.3 47.5 0.0 1.7 0
Sequils-Cen. V 01/04 B 3.42 137 41.5 26.2 48.2 9.1 48.8 3
TCW Select 01/05 BB- 5.11 107 31.0 26.2 49.5 0.0 8.0 0
COPERNICUS EURO I 01/07 B+ 5.17 62 39.3 32.3 54.8 0.7 16.3 0
Highland V 01/08 B- 4.91 179 43.9 31.8 58.1 0.6 29.1 5
Race Point 01/11 BB- 5.95 179 30.0 26.8 49.7 0.0 7.2 0
Carlyle H.Y. IV 02/04 BB- 5.54 244 31.4 24.0 42.2 6.8 29.9 4
Katonah III 02/04 BB- 5.61 103 32.6 27.2 43.7 1.1 12.5 3
INTERCONTINENTAL 02/05 B+ 6.24 109 38.9 33.0 52.3 0.0 4.1 0
Centurion VI 02/08 B+ 5.01 277 32.4 25.9 41.0 1.5 15.1 1
Saratoga I 02/09 B+ 5.44 278 36.3 27.7 47.0 10.4 38.7 1
Landmark II 02/09 B+ 5.37 98 36.0 28.6 46.9 1.5 16.2 3
Castle Hill II 02/09 B+ 5.31 143 33.5 28.0 47.1 11.7 37.5 2
RMF EURO 02/10 B 7.21 94 47.0 41.5 60.6 13.4 37.1 0
Venture II 2002 02/11 BB- 5.4 155 31.8 28.4 44.9 20.4 42.0 2
Castle Hill I 02/12 B+ 5 135 33.7 26.7 44.4 5.4 26.0 0
Gulf S.C. 2002-1 02/12 B+ 5.67 90 34.1 31.1 50.0 8.4 31.2 3
1888 FUND 02/12 B+ 5.43 142 40.4 31.7 49.3 29.3 50.6 1
LEOPARD I 03/01 B+ 6.83 58 43.3 41.4 58.6 0.5 8.5 0
Katonah IV 03/02 BB- 5.22 98 32.3 28.6 44.9 1.8 15.3 5
Longhorn III 03/03 BB+ 5.15 72 23.1 26.4 41.7 0.3 7.2 0
Race Point II CLO 03/04 BB- 5.48 208 32.1 28.4 47.6 0.5 13.8 0
ARES VII 03/05 BB- 5.2 118 30.9 28.0 47.5 25.6 47.3 5
Katonah V 03/05 BB- 5.06 90 33.0 27.8 46.9 0.9 12.6 3
LCM I 03/06 BB- 5.17 97 31.6 27.8 47.4 0.0 3.1 0
Waveland-Ingots 03/06 BB 5.02 101 27.0 27.7 44.6 7.6 30.0 0
NYLIM Fla. 2003-1 03/07 BB- 5.25 117 31.4 27.4 46.2 0.3 11.8 0
Gulf S.C. 2003-1 03/08 B+ 5.4 134 35.6 29.5 49.3 5.4 29.7 4
Clydesdale 2003 03/09 B+ 5.25 174 36.0 29.3 47.1 6.4 30.3 4
EUROCREDIT III 03/09 B 7.39 70 51.1 42.9 64.5 3.7 26.2 0
Union Square 03/09 B+ 5.28 128 36.0 29.7 47.3 1.0 13.9 0
Magnetite V 03/09 B+ 5.35 156 34.6 27.6 46.1 2.9 22.6 3
Ballyrock II 03/11 BB 5.45 149 30.0 26.3 45.0 0.1 9.3 2
Babson 2003-I 03/11 B+ 5.23 205 33.3 27.3 48.2 0.4 13.3 1
Venture III 03/11 B+ 5.81 186 33.7 28.7 49.5 1.4 22.6 2
(Continued)
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Panel B-Continued
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF DG
Landmark III 03/12 BB- 5.38 122 33.3 27.9 47.5 1.0 20.9 1
Aquilae I 03/12 B+ 7.17 73 46.8 39.7 65.8 14.0 47.6 0
Navigator 2003 03/12 B 5.35 166 43.1 33.1 55.4 3.3 32.8 0
LightPoint 2004-1 04/02 B+ 4.1 142 37.7 26.8 48.6 0.5 20.2 3
Clarenville 04/02 B+ 6.09 99 41.7 37.4 61.6 8.3 42.0 0
Ares VIII 04/03 B+ 5.43 210 38.7 31.9 54.9 10.9 48.6 4
Celerity 04/03 BB- 5.48 131 33.5 29.8 51.1 1.3 27.3 1
Leopard II 04/04 B+ 6.84 68 42.9 38.2 64.7 0.4 15.8 0
Northwoods IV 04/05 B+ 5.43 67 39.4 29.9 52.2 0.2 12.4 2
Boston Harbor 2004-1 04/05 BB- 5.57 126 32.8 28.6 53.2 3.6 33.9 2
Champlain 04/05 B+ 5.55 207 37.0 29.0 51.9 2.5 33.6 3
Long Grove 04/05 B+ 4.84 198 34.1 25.3 46.5 1.1 24.4 3
CENTURION VII 04/05 B+ 5.15 295 32.8 25.4 48.3 0.5 21.6 2
Jubilee III 04/05 B 6.59 64 52.7 40.6 65.6 1.1 21.6 0
Babson 2004-I 04/06 B+ 5.5 195 33.7 28.7 52.8 2.9 32.4 4
Petrusse Euro. 04/06 B+ 5.83 236 41.6 28.4 52.2 0.0 6.1 0
Carlyle H.Y. VI 04/07 B+ 5.67 210 38.0 29.0 52.4 22.2 58.7 4
AMMC III 04/07 B+ 5.31 137 36.4 29.2 52.6 5.1 37.1 2
Hudson Str. 2004 04/07 B 5.57 139 42.1 32.4 57.6 1.1 25.1 0
FIRST 2004-I 04/07 BB- 4.96 123 29.3 25.2 47.9 0.4 17.9 1
WhiteHorse I 04/07 B+ 5.81 119 40.1 31.9 52.9 6.4 39.4 1
Signature 7 04/07 B+ 5.23 83 41.5 30.0 51.7 5.1 33.7 6
Gulf S.C. 2004-1 04/08 B+ 5.68 156 37.1 30.1 55.1 3.9 35.0 5
Venture IV 04/08 B+ 5.75 234 38.1 30.8 55.6 4.3 37.4 1
Veritas I 04/08 B+ 5.95 113 39.4 31.9 54.0 4.3 34.7 5
Clydesdale 2004 04/08 B+ 5.54 245 35.5 28.6 52.2 0.9 23.8 2
Velocity 04/08 BB- 5.36 130 30.1 25.4 49.1 1.1 25.3 3
Flagship III 04/08 B+ 5.27 178 37.7 29.2 54.5 4.0 36.3 4
Essex Park 04/09 B+ 5.65 141 37.8 31.2 55.8 1.0 25.0 2
Navigator 2004 04/10 B 5.47 171 43.6 33.9 59.6 4.5 37.4 0
BlackRock Sen. 04/10 B+ 5.29 315 37.1 29.2 53.2 1.7 31.5 1
Landmark IV 04/10 B+ 5.64 136 38.2 30.9 52.9 0.6 21.4 1
Adagio I 04/10 B 7.69 70 53.3 44.3 71.4 10.1 44.7 0
NYLIM Fla. 2004-1 04/10 B+ 5.39 171 39.0 31.6 56.7 4.1 37.8 1
Babson 2004-II 04/10 B+ 5.26 337 37.0 29.3 54.7 1.9 32.4 2
LCM II 04/11 B+ 5.26 162 36.5 28.4 52.9 3.8 35.2 0
Hewetts Island II 04/11 B+ 5.71 122 40.0 31.1 57.4 1.3 26.6 5
Wind River I 04/11 B 5.29 174 40.0 32.2 56.6 0.1 13.0 4
Premium Loan I 04/11 B 5.52 132 40.0 33.3 58.1 30.4 61.9 3
Callidus D.P. III 04/12 B+ 5.79 183 39.5 30.6 56.8 5.0 39.7 1
Alzette Euro. 04/12 B 6.74 263 43.5 34.2 59.7 0.2 20.1 0
First 2004-II 04/12 B+ 5.24 126 35.0 28.6 52.2 1.8 26.2 2
Chatham Light 04/12 B+ 5.65 227 40.6 30.8 55.1 8.1 43.3 1
Whitney I 04/12 B+ 6.13 151 35.0 30.5 55.0 8.1 41.7 1
Average 37.1 30.1 51.9 4.6 26.8
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Panel C: ABS
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF DG
Bleecker 00/03 B- 6.83 35 57.2 45.7 68.6 42.9 62.7 19
Talon I 00/04 B+ 6.92 66 44.6 33.3 57.6 27.4 52.5 18
Phoenix II 00/05 BB- 7.84 47 43.5 29.8 48.9 5.3 24.6 10
Ingress I 00/05 BB 6.43 52 31.9 30.8 51.9 0.6 12.3 0
Varick 00/09 BB+ 7.75 86 26.6 27.9 52.3 43.3 69.6 17
PRUDENTIAL I 00/10 BB- 6.4 51 38.6 29.4 53.4 10.0 38.6 0
TIAA I 00/12 BB+ 6.68 104 28.5 23.1 48.1 7.2 44.7 0
Independence I 00/12 BBB- 8.45 83 29.2 25.3 51.8 0.4 20.7 13
MWAM 2001-1 01/01 BB+ 8.71 66 25.3 28.8 53.0 5.3 36.0 6
Saybrook Point 01/02 B- 6.54 90 41.5 37.8 63.3 66.6 83.0 15
NYLIM Str. 2001-1 01/04 BBB 7.56 87 19.1 19.5 40.2 0.1 13.8 4
SFA CABS II 01/05 B- 7.18 35 41.5 45.7 71.4 27.3 57.4 8
Independence II 01/07 BBB- 8.45 102 26.5 22.5 45.1 0.0 10.6 9
Arroyo I 01/08 BBB 7.69 108 23.3 19.4 41.7 0.3 19.3 1
Putnam 2001-1 01/11 BBB 7.23 134 18.1 17.9 38.1 2.4 34.0 4
MADISON AVE. I 01/12 BBB 6.72 95 19.7 18.9 33.7 5.5 31.1 11
Helios Series I 01/12 BBB- 6.31 72 18.6 19.4 36.9 6.7 30.7 10
Commodore I 02/02 BBB 6.38 52 20.9 19.2 30.8 0.0 2.5 7
Trainer W.F.R. II 02/02 BBB- 7.71 92 25.8 22.8 40.2 6.3 29.7 17
F.A.B. 2002-1 02/04 BBB- 5.91 90 23.5 20.0 33.3 0.5 9.6 4
Independence III 02/05 BBB+ 7.64 87 20.0 17.2 29.9 0.4 9.0 16
TIAA 2002-1 02/05 BBB 7.02 55 29.5 18.2 32.7 0.0 2.2 0
Anthracite I 02/05 BB+ 7 40 58.3 27.5 45.0 0.0 0.1 0
Aspen I 02/05 BBB- 7 26 32.1 26.9 42.3 7.2 19.4 10
ACA 2002-1 02/07 BBB 7.33 83 22.8 20.5 33.7 0.0 4.0 4
Saybrook Point II 02/11 BB 7.14 284 41.5 29.2 48.9 50.3 65.9 17
Charles River I 02/11 A- 6.87 89 18.7 16.9 29.5 0.0 0.5 19
ABS Capital II 02/11 BBB+ 6.75 109 18.2 17.4 32.1 0.8 11.9 18
Anthracite II 02/12 BB 6.99 44 60.0 31.8 52.3 0.0 0.2 0
Birch R.E. I 02/12 BBB+ 7 40 23.8 20.0 35.0 0.0 1.2 0
C-BASS V 02/12 BBB 6.82 47 27.1 23.4 38.3 0.0 3.1 0
CMBS R.O.S.T 2002-1 02/12 AA 7 29 22.4 17.2 27.6 0.0 0.9 0
Longport 03/01 BBB 7.09 155 28.1 18.7 33.5 36.1 54.5 19
Trainer W.F.R. III 03/02 A- 7 77 19.6 18.2 32.1 1.1 12.2 18
Northlake I 03/02 BBB+ 6.97 131 19.6 15.3 29.8 0.0 2.1 19
C-BASS VI 03/04 BBB+ 7 56 20.0 17.9 31.6 0.0 1.1 0
TIAA II 03/05 BBB+ 7.04 87 21.6 18.4 35.0 1.4 17.6 14
Faxtor 2003-1 03/05 BBB 6.9 91 21.2 18.7 35.3 1.5 16.8 3
ACA 2003-1 03/05 A- 7.02 100 18.3 16.0 30.0 0.0 4.3 19
Independence IV 03/06 A- 7.04 115 20.2 17.4 31.3 0.1 7.6 19
C-BASS VII 03/07 BBB 6.94 87 21.8 20.7 39.1 0.5 11.1 1
FAB 2003-1 03/07 BBB 5.99 89 21.2 18.0 33.7 1.3 15.0 5
N-Star R.E. I 03/08 BBB 6.94 69 30.5 20.3 34.8 0.2 6.8 2
Putnam 2003-1 03/10 A 9.02 207 12.0 16.9 35.3 0.3 15.0 17
Saturn Ventures I 03/10 BBB- 7.21 82 41.5 25.6 42.7 13.0 39.8 11
C-BASS VIII 03/11 BBB+ 6.98 66 21.2 19.7 34.8 0.1 6.2 3
Lakeside I 03/12 AA 10.55 89 15.9 18.0 34.8 92.3 94.7 19
BLUE BELL 03/12 AAA 6.75 137 6.6 9.3 19.7 3.7 26.9 18
Commodore II 03/12 A- 7.03 91 19.5 16.5 33.0 1.3 22.1 19
Trainer W.F.R. IV 04/01 AA- 6.9 95 15.1 14.7 29.5 0.0 4.0 4
Independence V 04/02 A- 6.94 155 20.4 14.8 29.7 0.1 9.7 19
Alexander Park I 04/02 A 7 127 17.1 15.7 30.7 0.0 6.5 18
(Continued)
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Panel C-Continued
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF DG
Knollwood 04/03 A+ 6.91 160 16.4 13.8 30.6 0.0 4.9 19
C-Bass IX 04/03 BBB 6.97 66 25.0 22.7 40.9 2.5 25.4 9
Newcastle IV 04/03 BBB- 6.99 58 31.6 24.1 44.8 1.6 21.5 5
Anthracite III 04/03 BB+ 7 58 52.2 27.6 48.3 0.0 0.7 1
Lakeside II 04/03 AA+ 9.09 145 11.7 14.5 29.7 79.4 88.4 16
FAB UK 2004-1 04/04 BBB+ 7.48 62 17.8 19.4 37.1 4.1 29.6 1
Vermeer 04/04 BBB+ 7.02 83 20.9 18.1 36.1 0.3 11.6 9
Bluegrass II 04/04 A 6.87 112 18.4 14.3 30.4 0.0 1.9 17
Klio 04/04 AAA 6.43 160 7.6 8.8 20.6 51.5 72.5 17
Saturn 2004 F.A.I. III 04/04 A 7.25 107 19.5 15.0 29.9 0.4 15.9 10
Saturn II 04/04 BBB- 7.2 89 41.5 24.7 44.9 1.2 21.9 11
FAXTOR 2004-1 04/05 BBB 6.85 92 22.0 18.5 38.0 1.2 22.4 3
C-Bass X 04/05 BBB- 6.87 98 32.9 24.5 45.9 3.0 30.4 2
ACA 2004-1 04/05 A- 6.98 102 19.4 15.5 30.4 0.1 6.6 9
Rhodium 1 04/05 BBB 6.78 66 18.8 19.7 34.8 4.1 27.9 3
Sandstone 04/06 A- 7 55 27.2 18.2 34.5 0.0 1.3 0
Whately I 04/06 A 6.88 184 14.5 13.6 28.8 0.0 6.0 17
RFC I 04/06 BBB+ 6.97 93 20.4 16.1 33.3 0.0 4.9 0
N-Star R.E.II 04/07 BBB 6.94 82 30.3 19.5 39.0 0.0 5.6 3
Acacia 5 04/07 BBB 6.93 95 23.2 17.9 35.8 0.0 3.9 0
Cascade I 04/07 AA+ 8.08 107 11.3 13.1 26.2 17.8 49.7 17
C-Bass XI 04/09 BBB 6.83 107 25.7 20.6 41.1 3.8 32.1 1
Bluegrass III 04/09 BBB+ 6.88 113 19.6 16.8 31.9 0.2 11.3 18
Newcastle V 04/09 BBB- 6.75 63 26.5 22.2 41.3 0.3 13.3 6
Inman Squ. I 04/10 BBB- 7.34 81 41.8 22.2 42.0 0.0 0.3 0
Klio II 04/10 AA- 7.56 113 8.6 15.0 31.9 84.7 89.8 18
Pinnacle Point 04/10 BBB+ 6.57 160 13.8 15.0 33.1 45.9 71.3 19
Sherwood 04/10 B+ 7.31 198 41.5 36.2 60.6 46.2 72.4 18
Porter Squ. II 04/10 BB 6.47 78 47.3 28.2 51.3 20.7 54.0 18
Laguna ABS 04/10 AA+ 7.96 218 10.7 11.5 25.7 36.4 67.2 14
Reservoir Funding 04/10 BBB- 7.08 99 19.3 25.3 47.5 53.2 75.3 18
Acacia 6 04/11 BBB+ 6.95 83 22.6 16.9 33.7 0.0 7.8 6
Whitehawk 04/11 A- 6.42 95 10.6 14.7 29.5 0.0 0.1 11
Hillcrest I 04/11 BBB- 6.95 129 29.8 24.0 45.7 3.1 32.7 18
Trainer W.F.R. V 04/11 A+ 6.95 109 17.2 14.7 30.3 0.0 5.9 9
Jupiter 04/12 BBB+ 6.98 106 11.5 18.9 38.7 33.2 62.6 13
C-Bass XII 04/12 A- 6.9 70 21.0 17.1 34.3 0.7 15.7 17
McKinley 04/12 AA+ 7.16 104 8.1 11.5 25.0 15.1 42.7 17
Revelstoke I 04/12 AAA 6.08 72 6.5 9.7 20.8 0.7 11.2 18
Cimarron 04/12 AAA 6.98 93 6.9 10.8 21.5 1.3 18.4 19
Belle Haven 04/12 AA 9.18 190 13.4 14.2 31.1 37.0 66.7 18
Vermeer II 04/12 A- 7.06 106 18.8 15.1 32.1 0.0 4.5 1
Witherspoon 04/12 AA+ 6.85 154 8.6 11.0 24.0 1.3 22.2 17
Faireld S.S. 2004-1 04/12 BB 6.99 75 49.1 29.3 52.0 2.8 29.3 2
Margate I 04/12 AA 6.82 229 10.1 10.9 25.3 1.8 25.8 15
Zenith 04/12 AA- 6.86 146 9.7 13.0 28.1 22.9 55.3 19
Ischus I 04/12 A 6.96 107 21.3 15.0 31.8 0.0 7.1 16
Average 24.2 20.1 37.5 10.6 25.5
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Panel D: CDO2
Name CDate WAR WAM N SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF DG
Lusitano 1 01/08 BBB- 3.19 72 21.0 12.5 23.6 0.0 2.7 0
Lafayette I 02/04 BB+ 3.77 30 32.1 23.3 33.3 0.0 0.3 0
Zais V 02/12 BBB- 6.99 49 47.4 26.5 40.8 0.1 4.5 11
Porter Squ. I 03/07 BB- 7 55 34.6 38.2 58.2 75.7 81.1 5
Hamilton 03/09 B+ 5 158 34.6 26.9 42.3 0.0 0.3 0
Tricadia 2003-1 04/01 BBB- 6.55 69 36.3 11.5 18.5 0.0 0.0 10
Zais VI 04/01 BBB- 5.69 67 42.6 20.9 38.7 0.0 2.7 13
Vertical 2004-1 04/03 AA 9.78 71 10.8 18.3 34.5 56.8 76.9 19
Tricadia 2004-2 04/11 BB+ 7.5 62 55.3 30.8 54.8 0.9 19.8 12
TABS 2004-1 04/12 AA+ 7.57 98 9.7 12.2 26.5 5.7 31.4 19
Average 32.4 22.1 37.1 13.9 22.0
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Table IV
Empirical Results for Average Default Rate Predictions
This table reports the average original AAA tranche size (Size), the average value of scenario default rate
(%) from (a) rating agency (SDR), (b) no-frailty model (SDR NF), (c) dynamic-frailty model (SDR DF); the
average value of default probability from (a) no-frailty model (DP NF), (b) dynamic-frailty model (DP DF).
The average values are calculated for each CDO types.
Average AAA Size SDR SDR NF SDR DF DP NF DP DF
CBO 71.7 36.6 27.6 48.7 3.8 18.5
CLO 73.6 37.1 30.1 51.9 4.6 26.8
ABS 80.7 24.2 20.1 37.5 10.6 25.5
CDO2 77.8 32.4 22.1 37.1 13.9 22.0
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Table V
Empirical Results for Regression Analysis
This table reports the regression results of downgrading notches on default probability with frailty (DPDF ),
default probability without frailty(DPNF ), the dierence between default probability with and without
frailty (DPDF  DPNF ). We also include the following controls: weighted average maturity (WAM), default
measure (DM), variance measure (VM), number of obligors (Obl), interest rate (rf ), S&P 500 Return (S&P
500), Dummy CLO, Dummy ABS and Dummy CDO2.
Independent Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Variables
DPDF 3.37 4.38
(5.44) (3.35)
DPNF 3.53 2.91 -1.47
(4.31) (3.64) (-0.88)
DPDF  DPNF 5.46 4.37 4.77
(4.24) (3.35) (3.46)
WAM 0.19
(1.11)
DM 3.36
(0.21)
VM -39.51
(-0.76)
Obl (x100) 0.50
(1.71)
rf -0.19
(-1.63)
S&P 500 0.17
(0.22)
Dummy CLO 0.41 0.66 0.31 0.34 0.34 -0.51
(1.09) (1.80) (0.80) (0.89) (0.89) (-1.03)
Dummy ABS 2.73 2.68 2.93 2.77 2.77 2.09
(6.89) (6.83) (7.36) (6.92) (6.92) (3.56)
Dummy CDO2 2.68 2.34 3.10 2.79 2.79 2.50
(3.65) (3.17) (4.46) (3.79) (3.79) (3.17)
R2(%) 10.26 9.33 9.15 10.32 10.32 10.44
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237
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